In any economic downturn, there is usually an increase in the number of demands made throughout supply chains and in particular by owners / employers on project securities (e.g. for performance issues, upon termination or following insolvency) and the recent global economic slowdown caused by the coronavirus pandemic is no different.
Summary
In Carey v Korda [2012] WASCA 228, the Western Australian Supreme Court of Appeal (Court) has provided a timely confirmation that legal advisers engaged by receivers to provide advice in relation to a receivership are properly viewed as advisers to the receivers as principal, and not the mortgagor company.
The decision will no doubt be welcomed by insolvency practitioners, as it confirms that the legal advice, and the right to invoke the associated privilege, belongs to the receivers, not the mortgagor company.
A recent development in the ever-evolving jurisprudence associated with business rescue proceedings relates to the remuneration of the business rescue practitioner in the event that a business rescue fails. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice (926/2016) [2017] ZASCA 180 has recently confirmed that the practitioner’s fees do not hold a ‘super preference’ in a liquidation scenario and the practitioner is required to prove a claim against the insolvent estate like all other creditors.
BUSINESS RESCUE, RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY: THE COURT’S POWER TO SET ASIDE THE DISSENTING VOTE OF A CREDITOR IN BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS If satisfied that it is reasonable and just to do so, a court may set aside a dissenting vote on a business rescue plan. In Collard v Jatara Connect (Pty) Ltd & Others [2017] ZAWCHC 45, the court did exactly that. Explaining his decision, Judge Dlodlo stated that there should be no reason to prefer a winding up application over a business rescue plan that will pay the employees of the company in full and result in a better return for creditors.
Once legal proceedings relating to a debt have started, does the subsequent substitution of one of the parties affect the prescription period for the debt? This was the crux of the recent Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) case of Sentrachem Limited v Terreblanche.
A substitution occurs when a party to legal proceedings is replaced by another party, with no effect on the cause of action.
In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v KJ Foods CC (in business rescue) (734/2015) [2015] ZA SCA 50 (26 April 2017), the main issue that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had to determine was whether the High Court of Pretoria (Court a quo) was correct in setting aside a vote by the appellant, FirstRand Bank Limited (FNB), against the adoption of a business rescue plan (plan) on the basis that it was reasonable and just to do so in terms of s153(7) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act).
Even the taxman must stand in line with other Creditors before the Liquidator. This is according to the recent Supreme Court of Appeal ("SCA") decision of CSARS v Van der Merwe NO. This appellate case dealt with a dispute about whether or not certain provisions of the Customs and Excise Act created an embargo in favour of the Commissioner of the South African Revenue Services (“CSARS”), thus preventing a Liquidator from taking possession of goods in terms of the Insolvency Act until all duty and VAT is paid.
Ever since the Companies Act, 2008 came into force, the courts have been inundated with cases pertaining to the interplay between the moratorium established by business rescue, the creditors’ claims and the effect of the business rescue plan.
Affirmative action measures were introduced in South Africa to reconcile the injustices of the past. Although policies have been implemented for the achievement of equality for persons previously disadvantaged, at what point do these policies unjustifiably infringe the rights of persons affected by them?
In Freshvest Investments (Pty) Ltd v Marabeng (Pty) Ltd (1030/2015) [2016] ZASCA 168, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was afforded the opportunity to pronounce on the so called Badenhorst rule which assumes its name from Badenhorst v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956 (2) SA 346 (T).